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INTRODUCTION
The process of making judgments and formulating convictions is a
vital function performed by all human beings. Successful accomplishment
of such tasks usually involves the integration of interoceptive cues (i.e.
past experience, feeling states, etc.) with exteroceptive, or objective,
information. Often, personal idiosyncracies determine the relative amount
of flexibility with which convictions or opinions are held, regardless of
contradictory information.
One factor which often differentiates maladjusted individuals from
normals is the inability of the former to correctly evaluate available
information when making judgments. An immature or disturbed person,
for example, may demonstrate unwillingness to postpone decision making
until sufficient facts are established. This tendency is referred to by
Frenkel-Brunswick (19^8) as "intolerance of ambiguity. 1 '
In some instances, as in the case of the schizophrenic, an inability
to tolerate ambiguous situations may result in delusional thought. Accord-
ing to McReynolds et al. (19&0, unassimalable information is not only
intolerable for the schizophrenic, but "anxiety provoking." The schizo-
phrenic alleviates this anxiety by developing "a system of false beliefs
which serves to reduce some of the intolerable inner tensions of the per-
sonality at the expense of reality distortion," (Jenkins, 1952). For
example, a schizophrenic who observes two strangers involved in a serious
conversation may become anxious if he is unaware of the topic which seems
to have the others so concerned. Unable to ignore this ambiguity, the
schizophrenic concludes that the strangers are talking about him, and is
thus relieved of much of his anxiety. Indeed, Schwartz and Wolfe (1959)
2have characterized schizophrenia as a "quest for certainty in unreality. 1 '
It has been noted that "paranoid psychotics experience great relief when
they first formulate their suspiciousness and anxiety in the form of organ-
ized delusions..." (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Framo, 1965).
This predisposition toward delusion formation, according; to McReynolds,
constitutes a "characteristic technique used by some individuals for
dealing with all kinds of ambiguous stimulus inputs." In other words,
delusional schizophrenics demonstrate a deficiency in sampling information
from the psychological environment.
Delusional schizophrenics, moreover, often tend to adhere rigidly to
conclusions once reached. In other words, once they have made some judg-
ment about the nature of a stimulus, delusional schizophrenics seem to
remain quite inflexible in their decisions and are slow to alter them in
the face of additional pertinent information. This could be interpreted
as a defense against the recognition of possible errors in their thinking,
a factor which could cast doubt upon other decisions, and prove even more
threatening than the original ambiguity. Though contradictory theories
appear throughout the literature, it is generally agreed that "rigidity
is a nonadaptive behavior," and that schizophrenics are more rigid than
normals, (Adams, i960). In 1937, Shakow and Rosenweig found paranoid
schizophrenics. to be more rigid than hebephrenics. Since paranoia and de-
lusional systems are often closely related, it is not unreasonable to assume
that delusional schizophrenics would exhibit a greater degree of rigidity
than those not prone to delusions.
Factor analyses of the components of rigidity bring to light two
points particularly relevant to the present study. According to the Elgin
3Prognostic Scale, (Wittman, 19^1), one characteristic of the rigid indi-
vidual is that he is "stubborn and opinionated.
.
.refusing to alter his
accustomed ways. 11 This "rigid strength tends toward evolution of an
organized paranoid psychosis," (Jenkins, 1952). Thurstone \19kk) also
investigated the factor components of rigidity and found the speed of
closure (which is closely related to intolerance of ambiguity) to be
one of these factors. If one component of rigidity is related to pre-
mature closure, delusional schizophrenics might be expected to be more
rigid than other schizophrenics, as delusionals are also intolerant of
ambiguity. Levitt (1953) also found experimentally positive correlations
between the acceptance of popular misconceptions, (which is a form of
cognitive and social rigidity), and intolerance of ambiguity.
In some of the studies of delusion formation (Draguns, 19&3;
McReynolds et al., 1964; Cashdan, 1966) this pattern of thinking has been
investigated with reference to structuring of ambiguous visual stimuli.
McReynolds presented delusional and non-delusional schizophrenics with the
McGill Closure Test, allowing them the opportunity to attempt an identifi-
cation of the stimuli or not, as they desired. His hypotheses that the
delusionals would attempt more identifications and guess correctly more
often were upheld, from which he concluded that delusional schizophrenics
have a stronger tendency to structure ambiguous stimuli than do non-delu-
sional schizophrenics.
The Cashdan study sought to define this tendency further by trying to
determine whether delusional schizophrenics structure prematurely as well
as more frequently* Cashdan employed a technique utilized by Draguns (1963)
which made use of drawings of common, easily identifiable objects, presented
in varying states of "blurredness" ranging from completely unrecognizable to
clearly distinct. Subjects were shown the figures, beginning with the
most blurred and becoming increasingly clearer with each presentation,
and asked to guess the identity of the object as soon as possible. The
number of photographs presented before a subject attempted an identifica-
tion was taken as a measure of the subject's intolerance of ambiguity.
That is, the later the subject guessed, the more tolerant of ambiguity
he was. Contrary to prediction, Cashdan"s maximally and minimally delu-
sional schizophrenic subjects did not demonstrate significant differences
as regards premature structuring with the blurred photograph technique.
The results of the McReynolds and Cashdan studies, however, are not
necessarily contradictory. The former author merely measured whether
delusional schizophrenics would guess more often than non-delusional
schizophrenics when given a choice to guess or not to guess. The larger
number of correct identifications made by delusional schizophrenics is
of course dependent on the fact that the number of correct guesses ob-
tained could not exceed the number of guesses made altogether. Actually,
according to McReynolds 1 figures, the proportion of correct guesses made
by each group was roughly equal. Therefore, while delusional schizophren-
ics tend to structure ambiguous stimuli more frequently than non-delusional
schizophrenics, it cannot be said that they do so more correctly. Thus,
Cashdan 1 s question of whether or not delusionals structure prematurely
more often than non-delusional* is a valid one. In his study, all sutv
jects were required to guess, and the variable observed was how much infor-
mation needed to be sampled before a guess would be attempted. The fact
that significant differences were not found in Cashdan 1 s study may have
been partially due to the fact that all his subjects were, to a greater
5or lesser extent, delusional.
The first part of the present investigation replicates Cashdan's
experiment in order to shed additional light on the connection between
premature structuring and delusion formation. This is basically accom-
plished by including a group which is not currently delusional, although
the subjects have a history of delusions. The other groups consist of
clearly delusional and clearly non-delusional schizophrenics.
The second part of the experiment examines the question of rieridity
in adhering to a decision once it has been made. In this study, the
measure used to assess the amount of rigidity associated with the sub-
jects 1 decisions is the number of increasingly clearer presentations
of the test object necessary to produce a change in a subject's response,
after he has been forced to make an early guess regarding the object's
identity.
It is assumed that premature structuring and an associated rigidity
are most markedly present in actively delusional schizophrenics, and to
a lesser degree in schizophrenics who were at one time actively delusional
but who, at the time of testing, had not been exhibiting delusional-
thought patterns. If this were the case, it could be attributed to a once
habitual learning pattern, the residuals of which have been maintained
over an extended period of time. Schizophrenics who had never demonstrated
marked delusions in their thought patterns would, under the above criteria,
be expected to perform most like normals. That is, of the three types of
schisophrenics described, those who have never been delusional should be
least likely to structure prematurely or to rigidly maintain an opinion
once they have formulated it. It is nevertheless predicted that non-
6delusional patients still will demonstrate more intolerance of ambiguity
and rigid adherence than normals.
Taking all the above into account, the study's specific hypotheses
could be phrased in the following manner:
1. vSchizophrenics will require significantly fewer presentations of the
stimulus pictures in order to attempt identification of the ambiguous
stimuli than will normals, (Ambiguity hypothesis # l)
2. Actively delusional schizophrenics will require the fewest number of
presentions in order to attempt identification of the experimental
stimuli, while previously delusional and non-delusional schizophrenics
will require proportionately increasing numbers of presentations. Nor-
mals will require the largest number of presentations before attempting -
identifications. (Ambiguity hypothesis #2)
3. Schizophrenics will differ significantly from normals in the number
of additional stimuli presented before a change in their decision is
indicated. (Rigidity hypothesis # 1)
Actively delusional schizophrenics will require the largest number of
additional presentations before they indicate a change in their decision,
while normals will require the least. Previously delusional schizophrenics
will change their responses with fewer additional presentations than those
who are actively delusional, but will require more presentations than non-
delusional schizophrenics. (Rigidity hypothesis # 2)
7METHOD
Subjects
Three experimental groups of schizophrenics and one control group of
"long term11 hospitalized patients with non-psychiatric diagnoses were in-
cluded in the study. The three experimental groups consisted of l) schizo-
phrenics who were actively delusional at the time of testing (hereafter
referred to as "Delusionals"), 2) schizophrenics who had a documented his-
tory of active delusions during some period of their illness, but who were
not currently exhibiting delusions ("Past - delusionals"
)
f and 3) schizo-
phrenics who had never been rioted to exhibit delusional thinking ("Non -
delusionals" )• These patients were drawn from the inpatient population
of the Northampton State Hospital. All subjects were obtained on the
basis of availability and willingness to cooperate. In the case of the
experimental subjects, diagnoses and delusional criteria were determined
from hospital records, and all categories of schizophrenia (eg. simple,
chronic undifferentiated, paranoid, etc.) were represented among the
groups, though not with equal frequency. Delusions, when noted either
past or present, were usually of a fixed nature and included ideas of
persecution* grandiosity, or self-referent beliefs.
Control subjects were inpatients at the Western Massachusetts Hos-
pital and the Cooley Dickinson Hospital, and were selected on the basis of
relatively long term hospitalization (two consecutive weeks or more where
available), and non-psychiatric diagnoses. Tuberculosis, orthopedic
problems, and other illnesses of long duration were included in this
category. The element of long term hospitalization was considered desir-
8able in order to partially control for the effects of extended institu-
tionalization in the experimental patients.
Each of the four groups consisted of 15 patients (10 males and 5
females), yielding a total of 60 subjects in all. They ranged in age
from 17 to 67 and were matched as closely as possible on variables such
as age, IQ, amount of education, socioeconomic status, and amount of time
spent in the hospital. Means and standard deviations of age, verbal IQ
equivalent, and number of years of education were computed for each
group and are presented in Table I. No significant differences were
found in these factors, either between groups, or between the experi-
mental group as a whole (i.e. all schizophrenics) and the control group.
Duration of current hospital stay was a more difficult factor to match
,
and because of the vast ranges within groups, median lengths of hospital-
ization were calculated. Median numbers of months in the hospital as well
as ranges for each group are also shown in Table I. Even though the exper-
imental groups had on the average been in the hospital for a considerably
longer period of time than the control group, this difference did not seem
to affect the experimental measures. Pearson r coefficients of .0^8 and
104 between the number of months in the hospital during the current
admission and the two experimental measures corroborated this assumption.
Subjects were excluded from the experiment when organicity was diag-
nosed or suspected, or iji cases of verbal IQ's below 80. Since the exper-
imental tasks were visual ones, subjects needing eyeglasses were required
to wear them.
Materials
The ambiguous stimuli used in the experiment consisted of nine line
9drawings of common objects such as a dog, trees, a telephone, etc. Each
drawing was sequentially blurred out of focus photographically until nine
sets of 12 slides were obtained. These ranged from perfectly focused
depictions of the object to unrecognizable representations. (Cf m Cashdan,
1966, for a more detailed description of the stimuli). The first slide
(#1) of each series was the most blurred, and #12, the clearest. Slides
were projected on a 4' x 5* ground glass screen in semi-darkened rooms,
with the subject viewing from a comfortable chair about seven feet from
the screen.
Procedure
Each subject was administered the Information subtest of the WAIS
to determine his approximate verbal IQ level.
Task A , This part of the study was concerned with the factor of
premature structuring. The following directions were read to each sub-
jects
"I am going to project a series of slides on the screen for
10 seconds each. At first the picture will be very blurred,
but it will get clearer as we go along. As soon as you feel
you have any idea of what the picture is, tell me. Then we
will repeat the procedure with the next picture. Do you have
any questions?
"
To avoid confusion, and because the objects were essentially unrecogniz-
able for the first few presentations, the experimenter introduced the
presentation of the second slide in series #1 with the comment, "This is
the same picture, only a little clearer ."
When the subject made an identification, both the identification and
the number of the slide were recorded, and the first slide of the next
series was presented with the introduction, "This is the next set," This
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procedure was followed for the first eight sets of slides.
TaskJ3. The second part of the study was concerned with the char-
acteristic of rigidity in adhering to a decision. In order to investigate
this phenomenon, the ninth series was introduced by the following instruc-
tions:
"This last one is something different. At a certain point, I'm
going to ask you to guess. I know it will be very difficult,
but please try."
(In certain cases, when a subject had been consistently making identifi-
cations at the first presentation, .the last sentence of the instructions
was modified to read, "So please wait until I ask you to guess." This
was done so that forced guesses would be made at the same time for all
subjects).
After the above instructions were read, slide #1 of series 9 was
presented for the usual ten seconds. Then slide #2 was shown, and after
five seconds of exposure, the examiner asked, "Now, what do you think it
is?" Subjects were encouraged to attempt the identification, if necessary,
or told that uncertainty should not deter them from guessing. One subject
in each of two experimental groups refused to guess at this point, and
were excluded from analysis on Task B, but all other subjects did attempt
an identification when requested on the second slide. After a guess had
been made, the identification was recorded, and the subject was read the
second part of the instructions:
"Now I will show you the rest of the slides of this picture.
They will get sharper as I go on, so you may feel you would
like to change your guess. If you no longer feel that this
is a picture of
__t___
(here name of object guessed by
subject was repeated), let me know right away."
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As soon as the subject indicated that he no longer felt the object
to be what he originally guessed it to be t the number of the slide was
recorded and the task was completed. This procedure was followed regard-
less of whether or not the subject offered an alternative guess
•
Subjects were given no feedback except to be told that their perfor-
mance was satisfactory. Care was taken not to allow patients to see
clearer slides of an object which they had already identified. These
precautions were taken in order to prevent discouragement over incorrect
identifications, and to avoid prejudicing subjects against making early
identifications if this happened to be their inclination. Accuracy of
identification was not a factor in this study. Only the amount of infor-
mation sampled before identification in Task A f and spontaneous change in
Task B f were investigated.
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RESULTS
Task A
The mean recognition level scores (point at which the subject
attempted an identification) are presented with their standard deviations
in Table II. Since the distribution of group scores showed considerable
deviation from normal distribution curves, non-parametric tests were used
to determine differences between means. Wilcoxon f s Composite Rank Test
was employed for tests between individual groups, while the Mann-Whitney
U Test, designed for groups with unequal N's, was used to compare the
entire schizophrenic group with the normal controls.
As the table indicates, the Delusionals made identifications at a
significantly earlier point than any other group. Though the difference
between the schizophrenic group as a whole and the normal controls was
not significant, the Mann-Whitney z score of 1.86 closely approaches
significance (.10>p;> .05), and is in the direction predicted by Hypothesis
1. No differences were found between other individual groups, but the
direction of the score increments was as predicted by Hypothesis. 2.
Task B
Table III represents the mean rigidity scores and their standard
deviations for all groups. Rigidity scores were taken as the number of
additional slide presentations necessary to bring about a spontaneous
alteration of the forced identifications made on slide 2, series 9. Thus,
lower scores indicate less rigidity in adhering to the decision originally
made, while higher scores show greater rigidity.
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Here again, distributions were markedly skewed, and the Median Test
was used for intergroup comparisons. On the whole, the schizophrenics
demonstrated significantly more rigidity in adhering to their original
forced guesses than did the Normals, Also, both the Past-delusionals and
the Non-delusionals had significantly higher rigidity scores than the
Normals. However, no significant differences were found among separate
schizophrenic groups. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was confirmed by the data, but
only the relative position of the control group as the least rigid was
upheld in Hypothesis
14
CONCLUSIONS
Task A
The results indicate that delusional schizophrenics tend to structure
ambiguous stimuli faster than do normals. If the mean score obtained by
normals is taken to represent the optimal point for decision making, then
delusional subjects can be said to structure prematurely, not sampling
sufficient information before reaching a conclusion. However, there was
no significant difference obtained between the total schizophrenic group
and Normals. Even though significant differences were not found between
the remaining two schizophrenic groups, the differences obtained were in
the direction predicted, indicating that the tendency to structure pre-
maturely may be related to history of delusional thinking in a manner
approximating a continuum. In other words, as Hypothesis 2 predicted,
actively delusional schizophrenics are most inclined to structure pre-
maturely, while some vestiges of this tendency may remain in schizophrenics
who at one time did exhibit active delusions, though no longer do so.
The fact that schizophrenics with no history of delusions whatsoever ob-
tained almost the same mean score as normals lends credence to the belief
that premature structuring is related more directly to the phenomenon of
delusion formation than to schizophrenia itself. It is likely that the
trend toward significance in the comparison between the combined schizo-
phrenic group and Normals is in part attributable to the fact that the
group is weighted 2:1 in favor of patients with records of delusional
thinking at some period in their illness. Another factor is that pre-
mature structuring could be considered a maladaptive behavior, and would
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therefore be more likely to appear in schizophrenics than in normals.
There is a possibility of course that within any group of past-delu-
sional patients there are individuals who are still experiencing delusional
thought patterns, but who have simply decided (or learned) that expression
of these ideas only results in negative reinforcement from individuals
in authority. It is pertinent to point out here, however, the statisti-
cally significant difference between active delusionals and past delusion-
als as regards premature structuring of ambiguous stimuli. If the assump-
tion regarding expression of delusions is valid, it would only indicate
that premature structuring is related in some way to the peculiar set of
psychodynamics which results in an individual overtly demonstrating his
delusions rather than keeping them exclusively to himself. Since this
mechanism of verbalizing delusions would be found always and only in those
patients noted to be "actively delusional," the relationship between pre-
mature structuring and active delusions would still hold.
Task B
As predicted in Hypothesis 3# schizophrenics as a group tend to ad-
here more rigidly to a decision than do normals once they have committed
themselves to a particular stand. If schizophrenia is considered a result
(or cause) of psychological stress, the above results uphold previous
findings (Smock, 1955; Moffitt and Stagner, 1956; Adams, I960) which corre-
late stress with rigidity. In general, then, it can be concluded that an
individual experiencing an emotional disturbance such as schizophrenia
would adhere more rigidly to doubtful beliefs or decisions than would a
normal individual.
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Since normals seem able to do without this defensive method of coping
with the environment, rigidity can safely be considered somewhat malad-
justed as an adaptive mechanism. It would seem logical, then, to assume,
as in Hypothesis k 9 that this rigidity factor would tend to increase as
individuals become more seriously disturbed. If active delusion form-
ation is considered a sign of severe psychological disturbance, then the
prediction that delusional schizophrenics would demonstrate more rigidity
than schizophrenics without this degree of disturbance, should be demon-
strable.
As the data show, however, just the opposite occurs. No significant
difference was found between Delusionals and Normals, nor were significant
intergroup differences noted. According to the data, the supposedly better
adjusted Past - delusionals showed more rigidity than normals. The Non-
delusionals - assumed to be the most well adjusted of the schizophrenic
groups - were even more rigid than the Past-delusionals, though not signi-
ficantly so. Both groups differed from Normals with a probablity of less
than .02. Thus, Adams 1 observation (i960) that "some schizophrenics are
much more rigid than others," apparently applies to those not currently
exhibiting delusional thinking.
Perhaps the best way to interpret these seemingly inconsistent
findings is not to look at rigidity solely as a maladaptive copiner mech-
anism. Rather, it might be more appropriate to view it simply as a low
level adaptive technique, one which requires a certain amount of stability
to employ, as do most adaptive techniques. Boverman (1959) maintains
that although the schizophrenic appears rigid, he also suffers from a lack
of rigidity. If he is not completely isolated in his thought processes,
17
such things as gullibility and lability can create problems for him.
The most disturbed schizophrenic, then, !i suffers not from rigidity, but
from a lack of ability to establish and maintain a strong sense of ident-
ity to which he uncompromisingly adheres." Fisher and Fisher (1950)
obtained results which seem to support this position. In general, they
found that schizophrenics who rely heavily on the defense mechanism of
rigidity and " 1 self-sealing off boundaries 1 for personality protection
seem to be clinically less disorganized than others in their respective
diagnostic groups." They conclude from their investigation that a tend-
ency toward an "isolating rigidity has a high protective value for ser-
iously disturbed personality structures."
Normals, of course, do not need to make as much use of rigidity as
a coping mechanism, since they have more effective psychological resources
at their command. However, it must be pointed out that the entire concept
of rigidity is a complex one, and still poorly defined. Its profitable
use in future studies requires a more precise definition of rigidity,
particularly whether it is being viewed simply as a maladaptive technique
or as a defective but nevertheless adaptive mechanism.
In light of the findings in the present study, rigidity, as defined
here, tends to be associated with a remission or lack of delusion formation,
in what may be considered to be less maladjusted schizophrenics, i.e.,
Past-delusionals and Non-delusionals. Since no significant intergroup
differences were found among schizophrenics on the basis of the rigidity
trait, a distinct continuum cannot be assumed to exist between presence
and total absence of delusions and amount of rigidity. demonstrated. There
does appear, however, to be an inverse relationship between the two
18
mechanisms.
t
Taking into consideration the overall evidence, it seems reasonable
to suggest that the unique combination of premature structuring and lack
of effective use of the rigidity "coping mechanism In 1 the schizophrenic,
bears a strong relationship to the formation (or expression) of delu-
sions. Since the direction of the trend seems to indicate a definite
pattern, further study with larger groups might be beneficial. If de-
lusional,, schizophrenics could be subdivided on the basis of the extent
and complexity of their delusional systems, as well as the length of
time for which they have held beliefs, the exact nature of the relation-
ship between premature structuring, rigidity, and delusion formation
mig;ht be formulated more clearly.
19
SUMMARY
In this study, the formation of delusions by schizophrenics was
investigated in relation to the tolerance of ambiguity and rigidity in
modifying conclusions. Schizophrenics were grouped according to the
presence or absence of delusions during the course of their illness, and
compared with hospitalized normals. Two tasks were administered to all
subjects. Task A required identification of an ambiguous stimulus, and
Task B allowed for spontaneous modification of a premature, forced ident-
ification. The entire schizophrenic group differed from normals on Task
A and significantly so on Task B # Delusional schizophrenics were found to
be significantly faster in attempting identification of ambiguous stimuli
than either normals, schizophrenics with a past history of delusions, or
non-delusional schizophrenics. Direction of intergroup differences were
found to be opposite to those predicted for Task B regarding the relative
amount of rigidity within the schizophrenic group. Results were inter-
preted in terms of a unique combination of a tendency toward premature
closure (intolerance of ambiguity) and relative lack of rigidity as an
important factor in the formation and expression of delusional thought
patterns.
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TABLE II
Group Mean
Standard
Deviation
Delusional
s
*
2.5 1.15'
Past-delusionals 5.5 3.56
Non-delusionals 6.4 3.23
Combined
uSchizophrenics
**
3.3
Normal controls 6.5 2.8
Task A - Tolerance for ambiguity. Scores represent point at which ident
ification was attempted. (* p«C .01 for differences between Delusionals
and other groups; ** .10 > p > .05 for difference from Normals)
22
TABLE III
« i. u «-*|-' Mai r\
Standard
uq v j_a oion
Delusionals 5.0 3.26
Past-delusionals 6.0 3.72
Non-delusionals
***
3.26
Combined
Schizophrenics 5.8 3.39
Normal controls 3.3 1.05
Task B - Rigidity* Scores represent number of additional slide present-
ations necessary to produce spontaneous change in identification.
(*** p<C .02 for difference from Normals)
23
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